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Abstract:
We developed an agent-based susceptible / infectivemodel which simulates disease incursions in the hog pro-
duction chain networks of three U.S. states. Agent parameters, contact network data, and epidemiological
spread patterns are output aer eachmodel run. Key network metrics are then calculated, some of which per-
tain to overall network structure, and others to each node’s positionality within the network. We run statistical
tests to evaluate the extent to which each networkmetric predicts epidemiological vulnerability, finding signif-
icant correlations in some cases, but no individual metric that serves as a reliable risk indicator. To investigate
the complex interactions between network structure and node positionality, we use a genetic programming
(GP) algorithm to search for mathematical equations describing combinations of individual metrics — which
we call “meta-metrics” — that may better predict vulnerability. We find that the GP solutions — the best of
which combine both global and node-level metrics — are far better indicators of disease risk than any individ-
ualmetric, withmeta-metrics explaining up to 91%of the variability in agent vulnerability across all three study
areas. We suggest that this methodology could be applied to aid livestock epidemiologists in the targeting of
biosecurity interventions, and also that themeta-metric approachmay be useful to study awide range of com-
plex network phenomena.
Keywords: Agent-Based Modeling, Network Analytics, Computational Epidemiology, Evolutionary Computa-
tion, Livestock Production
Introduction
1.1 This paper reports on an experiment that leverages network analytics and evolutionary computation to identify
indicators of network structure and node positionality that predict epidemiological vulnerability within simu-
lated livestock production chains. Weuse an agent-basedmodel (ABM) to generate network graphs and employ
network analytical techniques, statistical analysis, and evolutionary computation to investigate the extent to
which either single network metrics, or combinations of metrics, may serve as indicators of infection risk. Un-
derstanding these relationships will aid livestock production practitioners, managers, and epidemiologists in
targeting interventions which may preempt the spread of socioeconomically-important diseases through live-
stock production networks.
JASSS, 22(2) 8, 2019 http://jasss.soc.surrey.ac.uk/22/2/8.html Doi: 10.18564/jasss.3991
1.2 The field of animal health has received considerable attention due to the significant economic impacts on live-
stock enterprises caused by recent epidemics, as well potential implications associatedwithmaintaining a sta-
ble, secure food supply. Studies of diseasedynamics—specifically, targeted interventions toprevent outbreaks
—has thereforebecomean important areaof study for both scientists andpolicymakers (Schoenbaum&Disney
2003).
1.3 TheRegional U.S. HogProductionNetworkBiosecurityModel (RUSH-PNBM) v.1.2 is anABMdeveloped to assess
disease spread through regional livestock production systems. Themodel uses a GIS-based spatial framework,
with three important hog-producing U.S. states — North Carolina, Iowa, and Illinois — defining the study ar-
eas. Three types of agents — hog producers, feed mills, and slaughter plants — interact through the transfer of
livestock and feed, based on parameters including industry role, size, and proximity. The model is calibrated
to examine the spread of a fecal-oral disease such as Porcine Epidemic Diarrhea virus (PEDv), transmitted by
either infected animals, contaminated feed, contaminated slaughter plant receiving areas, or contaminated
transportation equipment (Schulz & Tonsor 2015). Expert advisory panels, coupled with available statistical
datasets, guided the development, calibration, and validation of the model’s heuristics and parameters, with
the goal being to capture critical complexities underpinning epidemiological spread dynamics observed in the
real world.
1.4 Because epidemics are fundamentally phenomena that propagate through networks (social, business, trans-
portation, etc.), the generation of suitably-realistic graph structures that position agents as nodes, and inter-
agent contacts as edges, is a basic design principle of RUSH-PNBM. Weighted edge lists built up by tracking
inter-agent contact and infection spread patterns are output aer each model run. Multiple runs across the
three study areas provide a dataset upon which network analytics are applied to evaluate epidemiological vul-
nerability.
1.5 To analyze the data, first, globalmetrics capturing overall structures associated with each study area network
are statistically correlated with both average and agent-level vulnerability. Second, node-level metrics indicat-
ing network positionality are correlated with individual agents’ vulnerabilities. Finally, realizing that epidemi-
ological risk is contingent on a complex interaction between both global andnodemetrics, we employ a proce-
dure to identify “meta-metrics” — using a Genetic Programming (GP) evolutionary algorithm — that correlate
with the vulnerability of nodes across three networks with diering structural typologies. Overall, we find that
themeta-metrics identified by the GP serve asmuch better indicators of epidemiological risk than any individ-
ualmetric. While the focus of this study is livestock epidemiology, we suggest that this novelmethodologymay
be applied to evaluate a variety of outcomes in a diverse range of networked systems.
1.6 The followingbackground sectionwill first cover the contributionsof computational science to explanatory epi-
demiological models at a general level. We then discuss the application of agent-based models to the study of
disease spread. Next,wehighlight relevant theoretical contributions fromthe fieldof networkanalytics. Finally,
we discuss previous research applying network science and computer modeling to livestock epidemiology.
Background
Computational epidemiology
2.1 While providing a firm foundation, it has become evident that observational epidemiological studies yield lim-
ited insights wherever there are large geographical areas involved, large numbers of infection cases, multiple
potential sources and/or pathsof infection, inherent uncertainty, incompletedata collection, and/or other com-
plications. Further, proposed interventionsmay act at dierent levels, targeting, for example, production prac-
tices, animal movements, or human-behavioral factors; as well as being either preventive or reactionary in
nature (Garner et al. 2007; Garner & Hamilton 2011).
2.2 In recent years, computationalmodeling has increasingly been employed toprobe such complexities, revealing
fundamental characteristics of disease propagation within complex systems (Garner & Hamilton 2011; Parker &
Epstein 2011; Perez & Dragicevic 2009; Perez et al. 2002). Using such approaches, researchers have identified
key infection nodes and disease pathways, evaluated health-policy scenarios utilizing both preventive and re-
actionary interventions, and projected the economic impacts of several disease incursion threats (Robins et al.
2015; Alderton et al. 2016; Belkhiria et al. 2016; Bradhurst et al. 2016; Tracey et al. 2014; Arruda et al. 2016; Bagni
et al. 2002; Schulz & Tonsor 2015).
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2.3 The strength of the modeling approach lies in its ability to distill real-world systems down to their core pro-
cesses. However, the complex nature of biological systems has led some to question the extent to which mod-
els should be relied upon to forecast real-world disease incursions (Moss 2008). For example, during theUnited
Kingdom’s 2001 Foot-and-Mouth Disease (FMD) epidemic, flawed predictive models were used to inform the
culling policy (Kitching et al. 2006). To prevent such occurrences, it is incumbent upon modelers to recognize
the limitations of their chosen approaches when drawing conclusions (Bousquet et al. 1999; Barreteau et al.
2003; Garner et al. 2007; Klügl 2008). We note up-front that RUSH-PNBM in its current form is not intended
as a forecasting tool, but rather to understand and quantify the interactions between network structures and
disease spread dynamics within parallel real-world systemsmore generally.
Epidemiological agent-basedmodels
2.4 ABMs constitute a class of complex systems models in which the global dynamics of a system emerge as a re-
sult of many individuals’ decision heuristics and resulting interaction patterns, rather than being defined from
the top down. Since they oen incorporate stochasticity, ABMs can be diicult to validate, and they can also
incur high computational overhead due to the quantity of calculations required (Bradhurst et al. 2016). On the
plus side, ABMs provide several advantages over other methodologies when the goal is to discover previously-
unexplored patterns that emerge from heterogeneous behavioral patterns, environmental factors, and espe-
cially when agent behaviors are aected by the state of other agents and/or a changing environment (Auchin-
closs & Diez Roux 2008; Parker & Epstein 2011; An 2012; Shi et al. 2014; Kaul & Ventikos 2013). Used as ”virtual
laboratories,” ABMs can unveil insights into the inter-agent interaction patterns that underpin macro-level re-
sults (Macal & North 2010).
2.5 ABMs focusedondiseasespread typically include twomaincomponents: within-hostprogressionandbetween-
host transmission (Hunter et al. 2017). Within-host progression describes the process of a pathogen infecting a
given host, running its course, and eventually dying out. A common means of modeling this is the SIR frame-
work, in which susceptible (S) agents may contract a disease and become infective; infective (I) agents can
transmit the disease to others; and removed/recovered (R) agents are conceived of as either dead, or having ac-
quired immunity to the disease (Anderson &May 1979). SI, a common variant, allows for repeated reinfections.
In general, parameters including infection probability and average infection duration mediate the dynamics of
within-host progression.
2.6 Between-host transmission occurs probabilistically when a susceptible agent comes into contact with an infec-
tive one. Agents enter into contact either at a rate governed by a dierential equation, or in the case of ABMs
according to the scheduling of their individual decision heuristics. Transmission probabilities may also be het-
erogeneous, depending on factors such as inter-agent distance, diering agent parameters, or network posi-
tionality. Modeling the interactions between a network of agents permits the simulation of realistic between-
host paths, as well as subsequent analysis of individual agent vulnerabilities (Barrett et al. 2008).
Network analytics and spreading dynamics
2.7 Network analytic techniques haveprovided insights into spreadingbehavior in awide rangeof contexts, includ-
ing information spread, diusion of innovations, disease transmission, and other phenomena. Researchers
compare and contrast spreading on dierent typologies of algorithmically-generated networks (i.e. random
graphs, small-world, scale-free, etc.), aswell as analyzing complex graphs constructed from real-world datasets
and computer simulations (Wasserman & Faust 1994).
2.8 The application of network science to epidemics has received considerable attention due to the ability of net-
work models to simultaneously depict the global structure of a population as well as the personal interactions
between individuals (Bell et al. 1999; Christley et al. 2005; El-Sayed et al. 2012). For example, the transmission
pathways that mediate the spread of a sexually-transmitted disease will dier significantly from those of an
airborne-transmitted disease, with the former characterized by interpersonal contact networks (Killworth et al.
1998), and the latter by global transportation patterns (Colizza et al. 2007).
2.9 Manyalgorithmshavebeendeveloped tomeasure andmathematically-codify aspects of network structure and
nodepositionality (Albert&Barabási 2002). Owing largely to continual advancements in thisnetwork-analytical
toolkit, researchers have increasingly worked to identify networkmetrics that correlatewith spreading dynam-
ics. Below we first present research examining connections between global network structures and spreading
dynamics, and second those which focus on individual node positionality within a network. We then describe
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how these insights have been applied to the study of epidemiological spread through livestock production net-
works.
The role of network structure on disease spread
2.10 Several studies have examined connections between the overall structure of a network and the propensitywith
which that network promotes disease spread. Christley et al. (2005) use an SIRmodel to compare spreading in
undirected random networks versus small-world networks (which have more heterogeneous degree distribu-
tions), finding faster spreadingbutultimately fewer infected individuals in the small-worldnetworks. The small-
world networks had greater clustering and significantly higher k-core densities. In both network typologies,
nodes in the k-core were at a higher risk of infection. Comparing unweighted centrality measures, the authors
find that degree centrality is about as good a predictor of a node’s infection risk as random-walk, shortest-path,
or farness centrality, while being simpler to compute.
2.11 Salathé&Jones (2010) investigate the role of community structure on spreading in networks. Community struc-
ture (a.k.a. modularity) in a graph exists when nodes are densely connected in “cohesive subgroups,” with only
a few bridging connections between groups. Using SIR simulations, the authors find that targeting high-degree
nodes for immunization can be eective in low-modularity graphs, but withmore community structure, target-
ing bridges between communities — identified by betweenness or random-walk centrality — becomes more
eective.
2.12 Kitsak et al. (2010) run SIR and SImodels on four large, complex real-world networks. The authors demonstrate
that a node’s “coreness” or “core number” — as determined by the k-shell decomposition procedure — can in
many cases be abetter predictor of spreadingpropensity than either degree or betweenness centrality. Further,
in their SI model results, the boundaries of k-cores tended to determine where an infection would become
systemic versusdie out. This suggests that coreness interactswith traditional indicators of risk in complexways:
for example, a peripheral yet high-degree / high-betweenness nodemaybe less infective thana lower-degreeor
lower-betweennessnodewithin the core. These findingspoint to theneed for further research into the interplay
between theoverall structureof agraphand thepositionof anodewithin thatgraphwhenestimating thenode’s
infectivity.
The role of node positionality on disease spread
2.13 Research has also focused on correlations between the positionality of individual nodes and their resultant dis-
ease risk. In anearly eort, Rothenberg et al. (1995) use surveydata tobuild anetwork tracking the spreadofHIV
within a small community. While their results are largely inconclusive— likely owing to the very low proportion
of infected individuals — they identify several importantmethodological insights. First, they draw a distinction
between egocentric network analysis (i.e. individual risk based on network positionality) vs. sociocentic anal-
ysis (i.e. how macro-level network structures impact group-level outcomes). Second, they consider whether
weighted or unweighted networkmetrics are better indicators of risk. It is unclear whether, for example, a per-
son who comes into infrequent contact with many other individuals would be more or less vulnerable than a
person who comes into more frequent contact with fewer individuals. Since measures of centrality, assorta-
tivity, and other metrics can be based on either weighted or unweighted degree, the distinction is important
(Wasserman & Faust 1994).
2.14 Bell et al. (1999) calibrate an SIRmodel based on interviewdata to reflect the network structure of a small group
of individuals, and use model output data from a series of runs to investigate correlations between several in-
dicators of network positionality and two dependent variables: (a) vulnerability, or the number of times a node
became infected during a run; and (b) infectivity, the number of times a node spread the infection during a run.
As in Rothenberg et al. (1995), both weighted (a.k.a valued) and unweighted (a.k.a. dichotomized) versions of
metrics were analyzed. The authors find that vulnerability is best predicted by unweighted versions of eigen-
vector centrality, information centrality, degree centrality, and in-degree prestige; whereas infectivitywasmost
highly correlated with weighted metrics including out-degree centrality, influence centrality, degree central-
ity, eigenvector centrality, and power prestige. Similar studies using empirically-derived infection-spreading
networks also find that multiple centrality measures correlate with infection risk (De et al. 2004).
2.15 Ghani &Garnett (2000) develop a stochastic SI simulationmodel of gonorrhea transmission through large (N =
2000) networks of social partners. The authors use nested Poisson regression models to compare the relative
influence of each node’s unweighted degree (k), concurrency, k at distance= 2, k at distance= 3, closeness,
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betweenness, and information centrality on both vulnerability and infectivity. They find that k is highly signifi-
cant in all cases, and concurrency improves themodel fit for both vulnerability and infectivity. Increased “local”
connectivity (k at distance = 2) improves the model fit only for vulnerability, whereas indicators of centrality
within the full network, including closeness and betweenness, are important in predicting infectivity. The au-
thors conclude that vulnerability is primarily contingent upon the structure of local network neighborhoods,
whereas infectivity depends more on the interactions betweeen individual behavior and global network posi-
tionality.
Application to livestock epidemiology
2.16 In the case of livestock disease outbreaks, the networks that underlie the movement of livestock, feed, sup-
plies, workers, and visitors are oen the ones that pathogens follow as an epidemic spreads. In addition to
direct disease transmission resulting from animal movements, disease can be also transmitted indirectly via
contaminated feed, fomites, and transportation vehicles (Fèvre et al. 2006). Network models of livestock dis-
ease spread encode the contact patterns between producers and other actors such as auction houses, animal
fairs, slaughter plants, and feedmills; each of which can be analyzed as a node in the overall network.
2.17 The United States Department of Agriculture Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service currently utilizes two
stochastic state-transition SIRmodels — InterSpread Plus (ISP) and the North American Animal Disease Spread
Model / Animal Disease Spread Model (NAADSM/ADSM) — to simulate disease incursions and evaluate the ei-
cacy of control strategies (Stevenson et al. 2013; Harvey et al. 2007). These models leverage empirical data to
generate spatially-explicit networks of livestock production nodes, and can simulate disease transmission via
either animal movements or airborne spread.
2.18 Network analytics can illuminate the flow of disease within a production system and provide insights into ef-
fective control strategies (Dubé et al. 2009). For example, livestock movement data reveal the most common
pathways over which infection was transmitted during the 2001 FMD outbreak in the UK (Mansley et al. 2003;
Webb 2005; Kao et al. 2006; Kiss et al. 2006; Ortiz-Pelaez et al. 2006; Dubé et al. 2009). Similarly, analysis of
Danish animal movement networks has allowed researchers to forecast disease spread through that system
(Bigras-Poulin et al. 2006, 2007).
2.19 Using an SI model-based approach, Natale et al. (2009) leverage animal traceback data to build networks of
Italian cattle supply networks, and examine the influence of “seeding node” positionality upon the final extent
of anepidemic, finding that the eigenvector centrality and closenessof the seedingnodeare strongly correlated
with epidemic size. The authors find power law degree distributions for both animal shipment sizes and the
number of shipments per node; characteristics of a “scale free” network with “small world” properties. These
properties have also been observed in other animal movement networks (Bigras-Poulin et al. 2006, 2007).
2.20 Wiltshire (2018) uses an agent-based SI model to analyze the impact of increased network density and pro-
ducer specialization on the size and scale of disease outbreaks in U.S. hog production systems, finding evi-
dence of percolation-type phase changes, withmore-specialized systems becoming vulnerable to catastrophic
outbreaks at lower density levels.
Contributions of this study
2.21 RUSH-PNBMmakes several advances over previous SIR-type livestock epidemic models, producing a network
with thousands of agents, multiple agent types with heterogeneous interaction heuristics, and empirically-
derivedagent locationsandoperationalparameters. Existingmodels suchasHarveyetal. (2007) andStevenson
et al. (2013) also use empirical data to generate spatially-explicit livestock supply chain networks, but include
only livestock production unit actors, whereas RUSH-PNBM also incorporates feed mills and slaughter plants,
which have been implicated in disease incursions historically (Schulz & Tonsor 2015).
2.22 Natale et al. (2009) include slaughter plants in their model, but only the movement of infected animals is con-
sidered as a transmission vector, whereas RUSH-PNBM simulates transmission resulting from contaminated
feed, slaughter plant receiving areas, and returning livestock transportation equipment as well. Thus, while in
Natale et al. (2009) slaughter plants serve only as sinks for animals moving through the production chain, in
our model they also function as hubs that may facilitate spreading.
2.23 A further contribution of RUSH-PNBM is that it realistically accounts for temporal concurrency. Rather than
inter-agent contact occurring with an equal probability at each time step, network edges in RUSH-PNBM come
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into existence only when the state of each agent (for example its current inventory), together with its individual
decision heuristics, dictate that a transfer of animals or feed should proceed.
2.24 Although thecurrent versionofRUSH-PNBMwasbuilt to studyPEDv transmission in threeU.S. states, its general
structure allows for re-parameterizations focused on increased context specificity and/or adaptation to other
diseases, study areas, or livestock species. This flexibility suggests that themodel could serve as a valuable tool
for practitioners to assess epidemic risk in a variety of livestock production contexts.
2.25 Following other studies investigating the interplay between network structures and spreading dynamics (Bell
et al. 1999; Ghani & Garnett 2000; Colizza et al. 2007; Webb 2005; Kao et al. 2006; Kiss et al. 2006; Ortiz-Pelaez
et al. 2006; Dubé et al. 2009; Bigras-Poulin et al. 2006, 2007; Natale et al. 2009), we analyze network graphs (in
this case output fromRUSH-PNBM) to determine the extent towhich key networkmetrics correlatewith nodes’
epidemiological vulnerability. Rothenberg et al. (1995) suggest that the fusion of egocentric and sociocentric
analytics would be a valuable approach for future research. Whereas in much of the previous work in this area
only a single network is analyzed, our study compares and contrasts networks from three distinct study ar-
eas, allowing us to investigate the role of both egocentric (node-level) and sociocentric (global) metrics upon a
node’s vulnerability.
2.26 Ourapproach todetermining the impactof eachmetric uponvulnerability is also innovative. Inmuchof thepre-
vious work in this area, bivariate statistical methods are utilized, with some authors using multivariate regres-
sions to investigate the relative impact of a suite of metrics taken together (Ghani & Garnett 2000). Rather than
relying on traditional statistical techniques, we employ evolutionary computation to search for more-complex
relationships between network metrics. Using a genetic programming algorithm, we obtain a set of “meta-
metrics” along a complexity / fitness Pareto front. We find that the GP solutions predict infection risk in our
data far better than any metric taken singly, lending support for the eicacy of this methodology.
Model Description
3.1 This section provides an overview of the basic features of the RUSH-PNBM v.1.2, including initialization proce-
dures, agent interaction heuristics, the epidemiological sub-model, parameterization and validation, and sen-
sitivity analysis. Themodelwasbuilt using Anylogic v.8multimethodmodeling soware. For additional details,
reference the RUSH-PNBM v.1.2 ODD+D Protocol (Web Appendix). Table 1 gives the model’s global parameters,
the values explored in this experiment, and the datasets and/or information sources used in parameter calibra-
tion.
Agents and initialization
3.2 Three types of hog production chain network agents, identified by industry experts as critical players in the
transmission of fecal-oral diseases, are represented in themodel, these being (a) hog producers, (b) feedmills,
and (c) slaughter plants. Producer agents are assigned one of six industry roles based on the classification
system used by the USDA and other industry analysts, these being (a) Farrow to Wean, (b) Farrow to Feeder, (c)
Farrow to Finish, (d) Wean to Feeder, (e) Wean to Finish, and (f) Feeder to Finish.
3.3 The spatial extent of the model is defined by the boundaries of one of three U.S. states: (a) North Carolina, (b)
Illinois, or (c) Iowa. These studyareaswere chosenbecause each is amajor producer of hogs, yet keydierences
exist regarding the size of their networks and distribution of industry actors, allowing us to incorporate the
impact of dierences in global network structure into our analysis.
3.4 We use the Farm Location and Agricultural Production Simulator (FLAPS) tool — which draws upon USDA Cen-
sus of Agriculture data along with aerial imaging to impute realistic distributions of livestock farms within a
specified U.S. region (Burdett et al. 2015) — to set producer agent locations and key operational parameters in-
cluding industry roles and capacities. Following FLAPS initialization, each producer generates a list of potential
producer trading partners, constrained by maximum distance, size similarity, and maximum number parame-
ters.
3.5 Livestock in the model are represented in batches (or metapopulations) of animals of the same age. Producer
agents are initialized with one or several pig batches — depending on their capacity — within the correct age
range for their industry roles. Farrowing producers periodically generate new piglets, which are subsequently
batched as weaner pigs at a rate dependent on their sow inventory, according to industry standards.
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Parameter Value(s) Source
Initial network parameters
Study area [NC, IA, IL] -
Number of producers in study area [2217, 6266, 2045] Burdett et al. (2015)
Avg. Producer Capacity [4015, 3265, 2264] Burdett et al. (2015)
Proportion Farrow to Wean [0.050, 0.026, 0.038] Burdett et al. (2015)
Proportion Farrow to Feeder [0.005, 0.010, 0.009] Burdett et al. (2015)
Proportion Farrow to Finish [0.554, 0.304, 0.635] Burdett et al. (2015)
Proportion Wean to Feeder [0.102, 0.064, 0.023] Burdett et al. (2015)
Proportion Wean to Finish [0.003, 0.077, 0.055] Burdett et al. (2015)
Proportion Feeder to Finish [0.286, 0.519, 0.241] Burdett et al. (2015)
Number of slaughter plants in study area [24, 18, 25] USDA NASS (2014)
Number of feedmills in study area [40, 114, 37] Google search; EAP
Producer to slaughter plant λ 2 EAP
Producer to feedmill λ 1.5 EAP
Disease parameters
Percent of producers initially infected 5% -
Avg. producer infection duration (days) 40 Goede & Morrison (2016); EAP
Avg. slaughter plant infection duration (days) 7 EAP
Avg. feedmill infection duration (days) 25 EAP
Suckling pig mortality rate on infection 0.9 Goede & Morrison (2016); EAP
Nursery pig mortality rate on infection 0.4 Goede & Morrison (2016); EAP
Grow/finish hogmortality rate on infection 0.1 Goede & Morrison (2016); EAP
Producer disease spread probabilities
Prob. producer will become infected if returning pig truck is contaminated 0.3 EAP
Prob. producer will become infected if feed truck is contaminated 0.8 EAP
Prob. feed truck will become contaminated if producer is infected 0.05 EAP
Prob. pig truck will become contaminated if producer is infected 0.2 EAP
Feedmill disease spread probabilities
Prob. feedmill will become infected if returning feed truck is contaminated 0.1 EAP
Prob. feed truck will become contaminated if feed mill is infected 0.5 EAP
Slaughter plant disease spread probabilities
Prob. slaughter plant receiving area will become infected if pig batch is infected 0.4 EAP
Prob. pig truck will become contaminated if receiving area is infected 0.2 EAP
Producer farrow, wean, and batch parameters
Farrow to wean sow proportion (relative to total capacity) 0.6 EAP
Farrow to feeder sow proportion (relative to total capacity) 0.5 EAP
Farrow to finish sow proportion (relative to total capacity) 0.2 EAP
Annual number of piglets per sow 34 The Pig Site (2014)
Max. wean and batch frequency (days) 7 EAP
Min. batch size (as proportion of non-sow capacity) 0.05 EAP
Capacity under which producer has only one batch 20 EAP
Producer livestock transfer parameters
Min. capacity similarity ratio 25 EAP
Max. producer to producer shipment distance (km) 150 EAP
Max. number of potential producer to producer trading partners 15 FHPC
Max. producer to producer shipment frequency (days) 5 FHPC
Feedmill parameters
Avg. number of daily feed delivery trips per mill 10 FHPC
Number of producers visited per feed delivery trip λ 1 EAP
Table 1: Model parameters and values explored in the experiment. “EAP” indicates that the value was de-
rived through expert advisory panel sessions. “FHPC” refers to the family-owned hog production chain system
dataset.
3.6 Because FLAPS only covers animal production units, feed mill and slaughter plant locations are initialized by
distributing them at random positions within each county in proportion to the number of producers in the
county, with the overall numbers per state being derived from available datasets in conjunctionwith expert ad-
visory panels. These non-producer agents are assigned service areas at initialization by having each producer
agent connect to the nth-closest of each type, with n being drawn from Poisson distributions calibrated in con-
sultation with industry experts. For example, in the case of feed mills, λ = 1.5, indicating that a producer is
most likely to purchase feed from the first- or second-closestmill, with fewer purchasing from the third-closest,
fewer still from the fourth-closest, etc. Alternatively, for slaughter plants, λ = 2, indicating that the most likely
outcome is for a producer to ship hogs to the second-closest plant. A limitation of RUSH-PNBM is that livestock
and feed transfers occur only betweenmodel agents; thus, since themodel’s spatial extent is a single U.S. state,
interstate transportation and trade is not represented.
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Figure 1: Agent connectivity key. Connections also illustrate potential disease transmission vectors.
Behavioral heuristics
3.7 Agent behavior rules are derived from a review of the primary literature as well as from industry expert advi-
sory panels. A schematic showing the basic interaction flow appears in Figure 1. Livestock are transferred to
appropriate agent(s) upon reaching the designated transfer age, and may be split and sent to multiple trading
partners. Feed mill agents periodically generate delivery routes that visit a subset of producer agents within
their service areas, with the number of deliveries per route being drawn fromaPoisson distributionwithλ = 1.
Epidemiological sub-model
3.8 Agents in RUSH-PNBM exist in one of two states: susceptible (S) or infective (I). Infection spread becomes pos-
sible whenever a susceptible agent comes into contact with an infective agent. Several modes of inter-agent
contact are represented in the model (Figure 1), each corresponding to a potential disease transmission vector
within the epidemiological sub-model.
3.9 Infected livestock transferred to a susceptible producer automatically infect the recipient. If a susceptible pro-
ducer transfers livestock to an infective premises, there is a small probability that the infectionmay be brought
back in the formof biologicalmaterialwhich has contaminated the transportation equipment. Once aproducer
agent is infected, it is assumed that its entire premises becomes infected, due to the high reported virulence of
PEDv once in a herd (Goede & Morrison 2016). The infection event triggers a mortality calculation that decre-
ments the infected agent’s livestock inventory according to observedmortality rates fromPEDv appropriate for
the age of each pig batch. Producers remain infective for an average duration of 40 days before transitioning
back to susceptible. If a producer ships out its entire livestock inventory, it is assumed that the premises is
disinfected prior to receiving a new shipment.
3.10 Feedmills may become infected if a delivery truck that has previously been contaminated (by visiting an infec-
tive producer) returns to the mill. Mills remain infective for an average of 20 days. While a feed mill is infective,
each delivery truck departing the mill may become contaminated. The truck may also become contaminated
upon visiting an infective producer part-way through a route. If a contaminated truck visits a susceptible pro-
ducer, that producer may be infected upon receiving a delivery of contaminated feed.
3.11 Slaughter plant receiving areas may become contaminated upon receiving a shipment of infected hogs. The
plant’s receiving area will remain infective for an average of five days, during which arriving transportation
equipment may become contaminated. Transportation equipment that has been contaminated in this way
may then spread the infection upon returning to the originating producer.
3.12 To skip the transient period and allowagent interactions to stabilize, the initial infection event, which randomly
infects five percent of producer agents, occurs onemodel year post initialization.
Parameter calibration and validation
3.13 Due to the lackofpreciseanimalmovementdata coupledwith the inherent variability of epidemiceventswithin
complex networked systems, we are interested less in empirically-validating the model to be used as a fore-
casting tool, andmore in developing suicient structural- and face-validity to allow for a deeper understanding
of the fundamental dynamics of the modeled systems (Klügl 2008). Even given identical starting conditions,
deviations in contact patterns over the course of a real-world disease incursion oen render precise forecasts
unfeasible (Moss 2008). Our aim is rather to uncover and better understand the network features that lead to
epidemiological vulnerability in livestock production systemsmore generally (Epstein 2008).
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3.14 Calibrationprocedures that leverageconcretehistorical dataareoen regardedas thebestway tobringamodel
in line with empirical evidence. Unfortunately, there is a marked lack of publicly-available data in the agricul-
tural sector beyond aggregated county- or state-level statistics. To the extent that datasets containing explicit
locations, operational parameters, livestock and feed movements, and disease histories exist; these data tend
to be held by private enterprises, which view them as sensitive internal records. In light of this, following Win-
drumet al. (2007), weemploy several alternative calibrationprocedures that havebeenwidely-used inprevious
modeling endeavors in which fine-grained data are scarce.
3.15 The spatial locations and basic operational parameters of RUSH-PNBM agents associated with each study area
are calibrated using the “indirect” approach, whereby stylized facts about the distribution of agents in the sys-
tem are gleaned from statistical datasets (Windrum et al. 2007). While the FLAPS tool discussed above (Bur-
dett et al. 2015) serves as our primary means to set agent locations and operational parameters, our team also
gained access to internal records from a large family-owned hog production chain system, which are used to
codify realistic contact rate and shipment size parameters (see Appendix 1).
3.16 Calibration ofmodel elements that define howandwhen inter-agent contact occurs, aswell as epidemiological
sub-model parameters,were iteratively honed throughout themodel developmentprocess following the “com-
panion modeling” approach (Bousquet et al. 1999; Barreteau et al. 2003). During the scoping phase of model
development, our research team convened two expert panels that included leading policymakers drawn from
industry associations (e.g. the National Pork Board) and the USDA, leading veterinary scientists, Agricultural
Extension agents focused on livestock biosecurity from several states, veterinarians working with major live-
stock production chains, industry communications specialists, and agricultural economists. An additional two
panels, involving many of these same experts, were convened during the model’s development. Finally, a fih
expert panel was convened to discuss and interpret the results of the model runs shown here.
3.17 In these panel sessions, we used both targeted focus groups as well as quantitative survey questionnaires to
elicit and hone parameter values. Through this process, model assumptions, data streams, and behavioral
heuristicswere shared, critiqued, and refined; and implications ofmodel resultswerediscussed. Detailednotes
were taken during these expert panels, which were subsequently coded and analyzed. This information was
used to bolster the face-validity of the distribution of epidemic patterns, scales, and durations produced by
the model. Using this participatory methodology, the modeled system was brought in line with the collective
understandings of stakeholders who are intimately familiar with the operational details of U.S. livestock pro-
duction chains.
3.18 A common perception among our expert panelists concerned the complexity of disease transmission, the vari-
ation of disease spread across dierent states and production chains, and the relatively-meager understanding
industry andUSDAprofessionals possesses relative to identifying eective leverage points in production chains
that arebothmost susceptible todisease, andmost critical to its spread. Given the complexity of theproduction
chain — with its segmentation of livestock producer roles from farrow to finish — and the importance of feed
mills and slaughter plants, industry experts called for thedevelopmentof anABMthat could capturedierences
between regions and the configurations of their associated production chain networks.
Sensitivity analysis
3.19 We conducted a sensitivity analysis focusing on four key model parameters. While the model includes many
parameters (Table 1), these four were chosen because each focuses on a specific aspect of themodel’s network
and/or epidemiological architecture. Prob. producer to pig truck infection highlights the impact of outgoing
disease transmission from a producer agent to either another producer or a slaughter plant. Avg. producer
infection length is an infection duration parameter, to which previous SIR-type models have been found to be
sensitive. Max producer connection distance evaluates the eect of altering the global network structure from
more localized to more spatially-diused neighborhoods. Finally, Prob. feed truck to feed mill infection aims at
elucidating the relative impact of infections stemming from the feed distribution network (versus the livestock
transportation network) on system-wide disease resilience.
3.20 Each parameter is varied in steps between 50% and 150% of the baseline values given in Table 1, with ten repli-
cations per step. Table 2 shows the elasticity of the response variable — average vulnerability — across this
range for each study area. Figure 2 visualizes the sensitivity analysis data and provides correlation statistics.
3.21 Results show that themodel ismoderately-sensitive to changes inProb. producer topig truck infectionandProb.
feed truck to feedmill infection; with the eect on average vulnerability being positive and significant in all study
areas. It would appear that Prob. producer to pig truck infection has a larger impact on the response variable
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%Change in Avg. Vulnerability
Parameter North Carolina Iowa Illinois All Study Areas
Prob. producer to pig truck infection 49.93 109.9 491.1 94.56
Avg. producer infection length (days) 2382 3164 6077 3010
Max. producer connection distance (km) 2.182 -20.32 108.6 7.976
Prob. feed truck to feedmill infection 36.21 114.8 119.4 50.82
Table 2: Elasticity of response variable (Avg. Vulnerability) resulting from variation between 50% and 150% of
baseline values for four key parameters.
Figure 2: Sensitivity analysis plots for four key parameters. Scatter points show average values at each step,
colored regions show 95% CIs, and dashed lines show linear trends. Blue represents North Carolina, red Iowa,
green Illinois, and black the combined dataset. Pearson correlation coeicients, p-values, and R2 values of
linear regressions appear in legends below each figure.
in Illinois, whereas Prob. producer to pig truck infection has the largest impact in North Carolina, reflecting dif-
ferences in network structure between study areas. Despite state-to-state dierences, the fact that increased
infectivity in both hog transportation and feed distribution networks both led to similar increases in overall epi-
demiological vulnerability suggests that our epidemiological spread sub-model is relatively balanced between
these two major modes of transmission. This ground-truths our model with respect to real-world findings im-
plicatingboth contaminated feedand infectedhogs / transportation equipment in the spreadof PEDvandother
diseases (Schulz & Tonsor 2015).
3.22 We find that the model is not particularly sensitive to Max producer connection distance. The magnitude and
direction of the eect varies between study areas, with only Illinois demonstrating a significant (positive, in
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this case) relationship to the response variable. While somewhat surprising, this result likely reflects the fact
that, despite increasing the Max producer connection distance, the Max. number of potential producer to pro-
ducer trading partners parameter remained constant (at 15) across all runs. This means that the average k of a
given producer would only increasewithMax producer connection distance inmore spatially-diused networks
wherein a sizable proportion of producers did not have 15 potential producer trading partners within the base-
linemaximum connection distance of 150km. This is more likely to be the case in Illinois, as there are relatively
fewer producers within a relatively large area in that state.
3.23 Bycontrast, increasingAvg. producer infection length causes significant increases inaveragevulnerability across
all studyareas. In lightofpreviousSIR /SImodel studies, theobservation thataverage infectiondurationheavily
impacts average vulnerability is not a surprise. Further, the shape of the elasticity curves in the top right of
Figure 2 suggest that percolation dynamicsmay exist, with the nonlinearity— or percolation threshold—being
lowest for North Carolina and higher for the other two study areas, corroborating findings fromWiltshire (2018).
Experimental Design and Data Processing
4.1 The model was executed 50 times for each of the three study areas, maintaining all common parameters con-
stant across repetitions. The total run count of 150 was chosen due to the large number of agents in each study
area, along with the relative complexity of the model’s livestock trade and epidemiological spread heuristics,
rendering each run—along with its associated data analysis—quite computationally-intensive. The full experi-
mental results encompass 539,300 individual agent-run combinations, with all networkmetrics and epidemio-
logical statistics calculated for each, yielding a substantially large and rich dataset totaling approximately two
million unique datapoints.
4.2 Thenumbersandspatial distributionsof each typeofagentwerehard-codedandmaintainedacross runswithin
each study area (Table 1). Further, immutable agent properties set at model initialization—including the pool
of potential trading partners—were also held across repetitions within each study area. Aer initialization, all
stochastic events in a run utilize a random seed, meaning that—while the underlying network structure associ-
ated with each study area production chain remains constant—the transportation of livestock and feed, along
with the resultant outbreak progression, is unique from one run to the next.
4.3 Throughout each run, a weighted, directed contact network was built up by tracking the number of times each
agent contactedanother agent—asa result of eitherdeliveringor receiving livestockor feed—with the final edge
weights being equal to the number of contacts between connected agents. In a similar fashion, an infectivity
network was constructed, with edge weights tracking the number of times the infection was passed between
agents over the course of a run. An agent’s vulnerability—the dependent variable used in the data analyses
below—is defined as a node’s in-degree within the infectivity network.
4.4 Networks generated during the experiment, along with key statistics associated with each agent, were output
as tabular data at the conclusionof each run. Using thePythonNetworkX 2.0 library (Varoquaux et al. 2008), the
weighted edgelists describing each network were used to generate weighted, directed network graphs, allow-
ing key global and node-level network metrics previously linked to epidemiological spreading to be evaluated
(Ghani & Garnett 2000; Colizza et al. 2007; Webb 2005; Kao et al. 2006; Kiss et al. 2006; Ortiz-Pelaez et al. 2006;
Dubé et al. 2009; Bigras-Poulin et al. 2006, 2007; Natale et al. 2009). Where applicable, both weighted and un-
weighted versions of these metrics were calculated, in order to compare between the two (Rothenberg et al.
1995; Bell et al. 1999). Themetrics utilized in this study are listed and briefly described in Table 3. For clarity, we
distinguish between the set of node-level metrics pertaining to centrality, versus those capturing other aspects
of node positionality. The full sets of global and nodemetrics used in the analysis were:
global = [〈k〉, 〈kw〉, kCV , kCVw , 〈C〉, 〈Cw〉, r, rw, pcmax ] (1)
node = [k, kw, k
in, kinw , k
out, koutw , C, Cw, c, C
B , CBw , C
RW , CRWw , C
E , CEw , C
D] (2)
4.5 To generate meta-metrics—that is, formulae composed of multiple individual indicators—we utilized the Eu-
reqa GP package (Schmidt & Lipson 2009). Due to the large size of our dataset, we first sampled the data by
randomly selecting 100 agents from each study area to include in the GP training and validation sets. Because
of the lower numbers of feedmills and slaughter plants compared to producers, we ensured that all agent types
were represented in the data by stipulating that a minimum of five agents of each type from each study area
were included, yielding 16,050 total rows. The GP was trained on half of these data (selected randomly) and
validated on the remaining half.
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Description Ref.
Global Metrics
UW Average Degree (〈k〉) Number of edges divided by number of nodes (Albert & Barabási 2002)
W Average Degree (〈kw〉) Average number of contact events per node per run (Albert & Barabási 2002)
UW Degree CV (〈kCV 〉) Coeicient of variation for unweighted degree across all nodes (Newman 2003)
W Degree CV (〈kCVw 〉) Coeicient of variation for weighted degree across all nodes (Newman 2003)
UW Average Clustering (〈C〉) Number of closed triplets divided by total number of triplets (Luce & Perry 1949)
W Average Clustering (〈Cw〉) Geometric average of the subgraph edge weights (Saramäki et al. 2007)
UW Assortativity Coeicient (〈r〉) Level of similarity between the unweighted degrees of all nodes (Newman 2003)
W Assortativity Coeicient (〈rw〉) Level of similarity between the weighted degrees of all nodes (Newman 2003)
k-core Fractional Size (pcmax ) Fraction of nodes that are within the main k-core (Batagelj & Zaversnik 2003)
Node Centrality Metrics
UW Shortest Path Betweenness (CB) Fraction of shortest-paths passing through a node (Freeman 1977)
W Shortest Path Betweenness (CBw ) Same as above, but incorporating edge weights (Freeman 1977)
UW RandomWalk Betweenness (CRW ) Fraction of randomwalks passing through a node (Newman 2005)
W RandomWalk Betweenness (CRWw ) Applies an electric current flowmodel across all nodes (Brandes & Fleischer 2005)
UW Eigenvector (CE ) Nodes connected to other high-k nodes receive high scores (Bonacich 1987)
W Eigenvector (CEw ) Same as above, but incorporating edge weights (Bonacich 1987)
Degree (CD) Fraction of nodes to which a node is connected (Albert & Barabási 2002)
Node Positionality Metrics
UW In-Degree (kin) Number of incoming edges (Albert & Barabási 2002)
W In-Degree (kinw ) Total weight of incoming edges (Albert & Barabási 2002)
UW Out-Degree (kout) Number of outgoing edges (Albert & Barabási 2002)
W Out-Degree (koutw ) Total weight of outgoing edges (Albert & Barabási 2002)
UW Clustering Coeicient (C) Fraction of possible triangles through a node that exist (Luce & Perry 1949)
W Clustering Coeicient (Cw) Geometric average of the subgraph edge weights (Saramäki et al. 2007)
Coreness (c) Largest value k of a k-core containing the node (Batagelj & Zaversnik 2003)
Table 3: Network metrics used in the GP analysis. Weighted (W) and unweighted (UW) statistics are indicated.
4.6 The GP algorithmwas permitted to use constants, input variables, the four basic arithmetical operators, as well
as exponential, logarithmic, and power functions; each of which was assigned a complexity value by which to











Table 4: Operators used in the GP analysis, with their assigned complexity values.
4.7 The objective set for the GP was to maximize theR2 coeicient between the function output and each node’s
vulnerability v— at varying levels of complexity — according to the function:
v = f(global, node) (3)
4.8 The GP was allowed to run until 100% convergence was indicated. The algorithm executed 1.6× 1010 function
evaluationsover thecourseof 112,378generations. 14 total solutionswere identified, ranging from complexity =
1 andR2 = 0.04; to complexity = 24 andR2 = 0.96.
Results
5.1 To analyze our experimental data, we begin by characterizing high-level properties of the production chain
networks output by RUSH-PNBM. This allows for a generalized understanding of the similarities anddierences
between the hog production networks associated with our three study areas, as well as the basic connection
patterns and epidemiological vulnerabilities associated with each agent type. Next, we examine the extent to
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which networkmetrics canpredict individual nodes’ infection vulnerabilities across the three states, examining
both network-structural and node positionality factors. Finding that no individualmetric adequately correlates
with infection risk across study areas, we turn to the GP results to investigate the extent to which formulae
composed of multiple metrics — which we call “meta-metrics” —may predict epidemiological vulnerability.
Characterizing study area production networks
5.2 Figure 3 shows the degree distributions for each class of agent and study area. Weighteddegree (kw) represents
the number of times an agent contacted another agent (i.e., sending or receiving either livestock or feed) over
the course of a run, whereas unweighteddegree (k) describes the number of unique agentswithwhich an agent
had contact.
Figure 3: Weighted and unweighted degree distributions by agent type for each study area, across all runs.
Plotted with log-scaled x and y axes. 60 bins were used for producers, and 25 for feed mills and slaughter
plants.
5.3 Overall, producers tend to have the lowest kw and k, followed in order by feedmills and slaughter plants. Feed
mills’ degrees are constrained to a smaller range, whereas the distributions for producers and slaughter plants
are quite long-tailed. Slaughter plants in Iowa appear to have somewhat higher degrees on average than in the
other study areas.
5.4 A linear degree distribution in log-log space demonstrates the power law relationship associated with scale-
free networks, satisfying P [X ≥ x] ∼ cx−α (Barabási & Albert 1999). This appears to be roughly the case for
producers, but it is less clear whether the other agent classes exhibit a power law degree distribution.
5.5 Additionally, we observe that the degree distribution for producers appears to have a dierent pattern in North
Carolina compared with Iowa and Illinois, with North Carolina having more high-k producers. An examination
of Figure 4 suggests that thismay be related to the heavily-connected cluster surrounding Duplin County in the
southeast of North Carolina.
5.6 Table 5 gives epidemiological statistics and key network-structural indicators, averaged by study area. We find
notable dierences in infection dynamics between study areas, with North Carolina agents having the greatest
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Figure 4: Samplemodel-generated production chainmaps (le), and corresponding network graphs (right), for
each study area. Maps show agents of each type (see Figure 1 for key) and infection-spreading edges in red.
Graphs show contact (black) and infection-spreading (red) edges. Nodes are positioned using a spring layout.
Gray nodes are producers, yellow are feedmills, and red are slaughter plants.
chance of receiving the infection at least once during amodel run, at pinf ≈ 46%, versus 14% for Iowa, and 17%
for Illinois. Agents in North Carolina also had the highest average vulnerability (〈v〉 ≈ 6), as well as the longest
average total infection duration (tinf ≈ 101 days).
5.7 Examining the averaged network metrics provides some initial insights into these disease resilience discrep-
ancies (Table 1). While the Iowa networks have significantly more nodes, the North Carolina networks are the
most densely-connected (higher 〈k〉 and 〈kw〉). Dierences are also apparent in the indicators associated with
the networks’ k-cores as well as average centrality values. In the sections below, we statistically evaluate the
ways in which these patterns in the network data relate to epidemiological vulnerability.
Can networkmetrics predict infection risk?
5.8 Since the probabilities of disease transmission and agents’ behavioral heuristics do not change across runs, the
disease risk discrepancies noted above must necessarily result from dierences in contact networks. We use a
three-pronged approach to analyze the relationships between network structure and epidemic risk factors in
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North Carolina Iowa Illinois
Mean 95% CI Mean 95% CI Mean 95% CI
Epidemiological Statistics
Vulnerability (v) 5.949 5.833 6.064 0.6504 0.6387 0.6620 0.9682 0.9480 0.9883
Infectivity (i) 5.949 5.858 6.039 0.6504 0.6310 0.6697 0.9682 0.9372 0.9992
Infection Probability (pinf ) 0.4634 0.4606 0.4663 0.1423 0.1411 0.1435 0.1703 0.1680 0.1725
Spread Probability (pspread) 0.6253 0.6225 0.6281 0.3440 0.3424 0.3457 0.3403 0.3374 0.3432
Infection Duration (tinf ) 101.2 100.5 101.9 14.97 14.87 15.07 19.94 19.69 20.19
Network Metrics
Unweighted Degree (k) 7.910 7.838 7.982 6.226 6.161 6.292 5.298 5.228 5.367
Weighted Degree (kw) 240.6 237.3 244.0 205.4 203.2 207.6 204.3 201.0 207.6
Unweighted In-Degree (kin) 3.955 3.904 4.006 3.113 3.053 3.173 2.649 2.596 2.702
Weighted In-Degree (kinw ) 120.3 118.8 121.8 102.7 101.4 104.0 102.1 100.9 103.4
Unweighted Out-Degree (kout) 3.955 3.903 4.006 3.113 3.085 3.142 2.649 2.601 2.696
Weighted Out-Degree (koutw ) 120.3 117.3 123.4 102.7 100.9 104.5 102.1 98.96 105.3
Unweighted Degree CV (kCV ) 1.565 1.565 1.565 3.047 3.047 3.047 2.172 2.172 2.172
Weighted Degree CV (kCVw ) 2.385 2.385 2.385 3.110 3.110 3.110 2.703 2.703 2.703
Unweighted Clustering Coeicient (C) 0.005178 0.005049 0.005307 0.007871 0.007723 0.008019 0.008816 0.008554 0.009078
Weighted Clustering Coeicient (Cw) 0.0003497 0.0003410 0.0003585 0.001100 0.001078 0.001123 0.001203 0.001165 0.001242
Unweighted Assortativity Coeicient (r) -0.5009 -0.5009 -0.5009 -0.2490 -0.2490 -0.2490 -0.5859 -0.5859 -0.5859
Weighted Assortativity Coeicient (rw) -0.2989 -0.2989 -0.2989 -0.3610 -0.3610 -0.3610 -0.4931 -0.4931 -0.4931
k-Core Fractional Size (pcmax) 0.2101 0.2100 0.2101 0.2673 0.2673 0.2673 0.1380 0.1377 0.1383
Node Coreness (c) 4.481 4.464 4.499 3.328 3.323 3.332 2.787 2.780 2.795
Centrality Indicators
Unweighted Shortest Path Betweenness (CB) 0.001415 0.001384 0.001447 0.0005033 0.0004919 0.0005147 0.001591 0.001557 0.001625
Weighted Shortest Path Betweenness (CBw ) 0.002875 0.002805 0.002945 0.0009989 0.0009845 0.001013 0.003430 0.003346 0.003513
Unweighted RandomWalk Betweenness (CRW ) 0.003213 0.003161 0.003266 0.001188 0.001172 0.001203 0.003534 0.003476 0.003592
Weighted RandomWalk Betweenness (CRWw ) 0.003401 0.003341 0.003461 0.001319 0.001300 0.001338 0.003870 0.003800 0.003940
Unweighted Eigenvector (CE) 0.01379 0.01370 0.01389 0.004814 0.004774 0.004854 0.01565 0.01556 0.01574
Weighted Eigenvector (CEw ) 0.001365 0.001244 0.001486 0.001240 0.001197 0.001283 0.002102 0.001971 0.002233
Degree (CD) 0.003469 0.003438 0.003501 0.0009733 0.0009630 0.0009836 0.002516 0.002483 0.002549
Table 5: Mean values and 95% confidence intervals for epidemiological statistics and network metrics across
agents in each study area.
the RUSH-PNBM output data. First, we examine the relationships between globalmetrics that capture overar-
ching features of each study area network, versus the average vulnerability of nodes in these networks, as well
as individual agents’ vulnerabilities. Second, we examine the relationships between node-level metrics that
capture various aspects of positionality, versus each agent’s vulnerability. Finally, we turn to the GP results to
identify meta-metrics that may serve as better indicators of epidemiological risk.
Global network-structural factors
5.9 Figure 5 plots the global network metrics described in Table 3 against the average vulnerability of agents in
each run. These findings may be analyzed in two ways: first, we can determine whether an overall trend exists
across all three study areas; second,we candeterminewhether a trendexists across the 50 runs associatedwith
each study area. Overall, we find that all global metrics with the exception of k-core fractional size do indeed
correlate significantly with average vulnerability across all runs.
5.10 However, the situation is more complex when examining within-study-area trends. We find that weighted and
unweighted average degree, unweighted assortativity, unweighted clustering, weighted and unweighted de-
gree CV, and k-core fractional size all exhibit positive correlations in some states and negative in others. Fur-
ther, the within-state correlations do not achieve significance for several of themetrics. Nometric we assessed
significantly correlates with average vulnerability both overall as well as within each study area.
5.11 While some global networkmetrics correlate strongly with the average vulnerability of agents in each network,
we find that global metrics alone do little to predict the infection risk of individual nodes, owing to the wide
range of vulnerabilities between agents. Figure 6 evaluates the same metrics as Figure 5, only this time we
plot the individual vulnerability of each agent, rather than per-run averages. Here we find that, in fact, none
of the global metrics taken alone is suicient to explain more than 5% of the variability in the vulnerability of
individual agents.
Node positionality factors
5.12 For real-world livestock producers, production system managers, veterinarians, epidemiologists, and policy-
makers it would be useful to understand the relationships between the network positionality of a given actor
and its risk of infection during an epidemic event. To investigate this, we plot each node-level metric from Ta-
ble 3 against each agent’s vulnerability. Figure 7 shows the various indicators of node centrality, while Figure 8
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Figure 5: Correlations between key network-level metrics and the average vulnerability of nodes in each run.
Weighted (W)andunweighted (UW) statisticsare indicated. Scatterpointsareaverages for each run, color coded
by study area. Black lines showbest fit, with Pearson correlation statistics andR2 given in legends both by state
and overall.
shows the remaining node positionality indicators.
5.13 We find that all node centrality metrics significantly correlate with infection risk when using the full dataset
composed of all three study areas (Figure 7). With the exception of weighted eigenvector, these trends hold
within each study area as well. The centrality metric with the most consistent positive correlation to vulnera-
bility across study areas would appear to be degree centrality.
5.14 However, linear regressions reveal that, despite achieving significant p-values, no centrality indicator explains
more than 22%of the variability in the response variable across all study areas. Additionally, we find significant
variability in the explanatory power of the correlations between study areas. This lends further evidence to
the assertion that there is a complex interplay between the structure of a network overall and the eicacy of
node-level metrics for determining risk.
5.15 Turning to the remainingnodepositionality indicators (Figure8), we find—unsurprisingly— thatbothweighted
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Figure 6: Correlations between key network-level metrics and node-level vulnerability. Weighted (W) and un-
weighted (UW) statistics are indicated. Scatter points represent each agent in each run, color coded by study
area. Black lines show best fit, with Pearson correlation statistics and R2 given in legends both by state and
overall.
and unweighted in-degree are relatively-strong predictors of vulnerability, with theweightedmetric explaining
30% of the variability in the response variable. Simply stated, the more times a node is exposed to a potential
threat by way of incoming livestock or feed, the more likely it is to be infected. We find that out-degree and
clustering coeicient (both weighted and unweighted) do not explain a node’s vulnerability. A node’s coreness
is amoderate (R2 = 0.09) predictor of vulnerability across study areas, suggesting that subsets ofmore highly-
interconnected nodes may be largely responsible for sustaining outbreaks.
Using Genetic Programming to develop better vulnerability indicators
5.16 Our preliminary findings suggest that, while both global and node-level metrics correlate with epidemiological
vulnerability in some contexts, there are likely complexities arising from the interplay between these factors,
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Figure 7: Correlations between centrality metrics and vulnerability. Weighted (W) and unweighted (UW) statis-
tics are indicated. Scatter points represent each agent in each run, color coded by study area. Lines show best
fit for each state as well as overall, with Pearson correlation statistics andR2 given in legends both by state and
overall.
and no single indicator has a suiciently highR2 value to be of much use. The development of indicators that
consistently identify risk— ideally accounting for bothoverall network structure andnodepositionalitywithin a
network—would be aboon for epidemiological analysts seeking to target biosecurity interventions in livestock
production systems.
5.17 To identify such meta-metrics, we employ a GP algorithm to search the solution space for mathematical com-
binations of individual indicators along a complexity / fitness Pareto front (Schmidt & Lipson 2009). Of the 14
possible solutions generated by the GP, six were chosen for further analysis (Table 6). This subset of solutions
aims to sample a range of complexity / fitness pairings, with solutions situated at “knees” of the Pareto front
preferredwhere possible (Branke et al. 2004). To avoid overfitting the data, solutions beyond a complexity level
of 14 are not considered, as there is very little improvement in fitness beyond that point.
5.18 Overall, it is notable that the better-performing of the GP solutions incorporate both node-level and global
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Figure 8: Correlations between key node-level metrics and vulnerability. Weighted (W) and unweighted (UW)
statistics are indicated. Scatter points represent each agent in each run, color coded by study area. Lines show
best fit for each state aswell as overall, with Pearson correlation statistics andR2 given in legends both by state
and overall.
metrics. The most frequently-used node-level metrics are first and foremost weighted in-degree — which is
used in all six possible solutions — followed by coreness, unweighted in-degree, unweighted total degree, and
weightedeigenvector centrality. Themost common (and indeed, only)globalmetric included in theGP formuae
is weighted clustering.
5.19 Figure 9 plots the results of the GP solutions against the vulnerability of each node in the same manner as
Figures 6, 7, and 8. We find that all of the GP solutions far outperform any individual metric, providing support
for the value of the GP-derived meta-metric approach. The best of the GP solutions (S4 and S6) explain 91% of
the variability in the response variable, while the best single metric (kinw ) explains just 30%.
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Solution Complexity R2 Max. Error
S1 v = 0.0035 · kinw · c 5 0.5496 240.8
S2 v = 0.011 · kinw · c− kin 7 0.9082 102.4
S3 v = 2.76× 10−6 · kinw · c/〈Cw〉 8 0.9331 120.9
S4 v = 3.46× 10−7 · kinw · c2/〈Cw〉 10 0.9515 91.68
S5 v = kinw ·
(
0.0010 · c2 − 14.3 · 〈Cw〉
)
13 0.9531 83.64
S6 v = kin · CEw + 3.42× 10−7 · kinw · c2/〈Cw〉 14 0.9562 75.79
Table 6: Six possible GP solutions along the complexity / fitness Pareto front. Fitness is defined as theR2 value
on the validation data. Red variables are from the global set; blue are from the node set — yet require a full
network graph to calculate — and green are from the node set and require only node-level data. Constants are
truncated to two significant figures. Equations are algebraically-simplified where applicable.
Figure 9: Correlations between six GP solutions and vulnerability. Scatter points represent each agent in each
run, color coded by study area (blue = NC; red = IA; green = IL). Lines show best fit for each study area as well
as overall, with Pearson correlation statistics andR2 given in legends. Note that, unlike theR2 values given in
Table 6 — which are calculated only on the GP validation set — the R2 values here are calculated on the full
dataset output from themodel.
Discussion and Conclusions
6.1 In this study, we apply agent-based computer modeling, network analytics, and evolutionary computation to
explore the impact of key network metrics on the epidemiological vulnerability of livestock production chain
actors. We analyze the extent to which indicators describing the structure of a complex contact network can
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be combined with those pertaining to a node’s positionality within that network to arrive at better risk indica-
tors. To this end, we demonstrate the feasibility of using a GP algorithm to formulate such meta-metrics and,
at least in this context, we find that the GP solutions outperform any single indicator of epidemiological vul-
nerability. Below, we discuss how the meta-metric method could be used by real-world practitioners, address
methodological issues surrounding data availability and context specificity, and propose future research goals.
6.2 Previous research in this area has largely explored bivariate correlations between of a suite of metrics and epi-
demiological outcomes — at either the network or individual level — in both simulated and real-world net-
worked systems (Rothenberg et al. 1995; Bell et al. 1999; De et al. 2004; Christley et al. 2005; Salathé & Jones
2010; Kitsak et al. 2010). Multivariate statistical techniques have also been used to evaluate the relative eect of
multiple node-level metrics on individual vulnerability (Ghani & Garnett 2000). The GP methodology we have
employed expands on this work, searching the solution space to identify mathematical relationships encom-
passing multiple metrics to predict a node’s vulnerability across three networks with diering sizes, densities,
and internal structures.
6.3 The ability of our GP approach to identify meta-metrics that capture complexities arising from the interac-
tions between global and node-level network features suggests that this methodology may have widespread
applicability. The particular networks evaluated in this experiment were state-level livestock production sys-
tems generated by a computer model, but we believe the procedures used to analyze the network data and
identify meta-metrics could be applied to study phenomena on a wide range of graphs, both empirically- and
computationally-derived. Whilewehaveapplied themeta-metric approach tostudyepidemiologicaldynamics,
meta-metrics could equally be formulated to predict other important graph properties, such as the probability
that anodewill addorpruneedgesover time, the frequencywithwhichanodewill enter somestate, or virtually
any other outcome variable of interest.
Global vs. nodemetrics as indicators of vulnerability
6.4 We find that the globalmetrics, while serving as reasonably-accurate predictors of average vulnerability within
each study area, do little to predict the risk of an individual agent within each run, as a result of the high vari-
ability in vulnerability across agents of dierent classes, andwithdierent networkpositionality characteristics
(Figure 6).
6.5 Several of the node-level metrics, such as degree centrality and weighted in-degree, perform reasonably well
as predictors of an agent’s vulnerability (R2 = 0.22 and 0.30 respectively). However, many of the nodemetrics
demonstrate dierential correlation coeicients across each study area, indicating that risk cannot be accu-
rately predicted by node-level indicators alone (Figures 7 and 8).
Evaluating GP-derivedmeta-metrics
6.6 Turning to theGP solutions, we find that the best-performingmeta-metrics (S3–S6) incorporate both global and
node-level indicators. Further, among the nodemetrics, we note that some of the calculations — for example
weighted in-degree — require only local information from each node for calculation (indicated in green in Ta-
ble 6). However, other nodemetrics — for example coreness — require that a full graph of the network is first
codified (indicated in blue in Table 6). Notably, all six of the GP solutions we analyzed do require at least one
instance of a nodemetric that falls into this latter category (primarily coreness in this case), emphasizing the
interplay between global network structures and node positionality in the prediction of infection risk.
6.7 Weighing the six meta-metric solutions against one another, S4 and S6 are the best performing of the set, each
achieving a high overallR2 value of 0.91 on the full dataset. Table 6 reveals that S6, while more complex, cuts
themaximumerror from91.68 for S4 to 75.79 for S6, suggesting that the additional complexity pays o in terms
of predictive accuracy in this context. Overall, we conclude that the GP approach to determining eective pre-
dictors of epidemiological risk by combining indicators of network structurewith node positionality represents
an eective and under-explored mechanism to evaluate the infection vulnerability of individual nodes within
networks.
Application to real-world decision-making
6.8 Aside from demonstrating the applicability of our methodology, this work is also intended to inform practi-
tioners in their eorts to strategically-allocate resources which improve epidemiological resilience in existing
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livestock production systems. Whilewe donotwish to imply that the results presented here can reliably predict
the course of any real-world disease incursion, our findings suggest several novel ways for livestock epidemiol-
ogists to approach risk analysis.
6.9 Perhaps themost important takeaway from our study is that risk is a function of both network structure and in-
dividual decision-making. Biosecurity measures — such as shower-in-shower-out facilities, lines of separation,
or all-in-all-out protocols — have proven eective in limiting the scope of livestock disease outbreaks. While a
producer’s primary motivation to adopt such measures is rooted in individual risk reduction, from a systems
perspective, our research suggests that biosecurity protocols would be vastly more eective if implemented at
especially-vulnerable network loci. Themethods presented in this study allow for the identification of nodes in
a systemmost likely to play a role in disease spread, which can then inform targeted biosecurity interventions
to reduce systemic risk.
6.10 The lack of available fine-grained U.S. animal movement data currently represents a major hurdle for network
analysts and modelers interested in livestock disease risk mitigation. Animal traceback protocols, which track
the movement of livestock between premises over their full lifespans, remain controversial in the U.S., likely
due to attitudes around privacy. While consumer protection (recalls, etc.) is the most-cited reason for the im-
plementation of traceback protocols, in light of our findings, an additional consideration is that traceback data
could be used to codify accurate network representations of livestock supply chains, as has been done in other
countries (Caporale et al. 2001; Natale et al. 2009).
6.11 Given suicient input data, RUSH-PNBM could be parameterized to guide on-the-ground policy and manage-
rial decisions. By encoding the interaction patterns and animal movements between actors in real-world pro-
duction systems into network graphs, and then incorporating data tracking the spread of a historical outbreak
through the system, it becomes possible to apply the methods we have presented to actual disease incursion
threat scenarios.
6.12 Model use cases could focus on dierent scales. For example, national agencies such as the USDA could use
RUSH-PNBM to target nationwide interventions — such as the placement of truck-wash sites — or to propose
health and safety regulations focused on potential “hubs” like slaughter plants and feed mills. Alternatively,
owners and managers of private livestock production chain systems could employ specifically-parameterized
versions of the model to assess disease risks within their own systems. This would facilitate both insights into
the individual network loci at which biosecurity protocols could do the most good, as well as analyses of how
reorganization of network structures could improve system-wide disease resilience.
Expert panelist feedback
6.13 The variation of individual node vulnerabilities found in our results did not surprise our panelists: the relation-
ship between an individual node’s vulnerability and its position and/or function in the network matters. The
potential of our model to identify those nodes with the highest disease risk casts light on an important infor-
mational need raised in our panel sessions. Coupled with finer-grained and more-detailed data (such as the
widespread use of animal traceback protocols), panelists agreed that RUSH-PNBM — together with the meta-
metric methodology— could represent a valuable tool whichmay be leveraged to identify where best to target
biosecurity measures.
6.14 Interestingly, many of the expert panelists were less interested in some of the broader structural implications
that may be drawn from this study. For example, despite its demonstrated biosecurity implications, minimiz-
ing the bridging links within livestock production networks by reducing producer over-specialization was not
universally deemed desirable. However, more recent engagement between our research team and owners of
mid-sized, leading-edge production chain systems has revealed an openness to rethinking the role of network
connectivity structures upon biosecurity within the context of their own operational networks.
Limitations of our approach
6.15 Macro-scale socio-economic and political factors can directly and indirectly influence the economic incentives,
disease patterns, and network-structural parameters embedded in RUSH-PNBM.While this study demonstrates
the limited generalizability of ourmodel across three states in the U.S., application of themodel to other socio-
economic andpolitical contexts (e.g. the EU)will require careful re-calibration and validation ofmodel parame-
ters, including securing relevant datasets and convening additional expert panels. Extensibility of RUSH-PNBM
to generate medium- to long-term (i.e. 30- to 50-year) scenarios would also require refinement of simulation
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processes and parameters to account for projected changes in economic and political conditions within which
the simulated networks operate.
6.16 As noted above, practical implementation of this new meta-metric approach (i.e. to guide policymaking) will
require better contextualization of the network structures and underlying theoretical assumptions governing
network dynamics. Due to complex government-industry relationships and competition within the livestock
production industry, empirical data concerning underlying network structures, animal movements, epidemic
spreaddata, and other important factors are not typically easily available. Fortunately, ABMs—acting as virtual
laboratories (Macal &North 2010)—enable testing of alternate assumptions about network structures and their
underlying dynamics. As described above, widespread adoption of animal traceback protocols would go a long
way toward solving the data availability issue.
Directions for future research
6.17 Previous studies investigating the impactofnetworkpositionalityonepidemiological riskdierentiatebetween
vulnerability—whichwehaveusedasourdependentvariable—and infectivity, i.e. the frequencywithwhichan
actor spreads the disease to others (Rothenberg et al. 1995; Ghani & Garnett 2000). Understanding both factors
is important to guide the implementation of interventions which curb disease spread, as some protocols are
designed to prevent incoming disease threats, whereas others are aimed at limiting outgoing infection spread.
An area for future research is to develop GP-derivedmeta-metrics that correlate with a node’s infectivity rather
than its vulnerability. For example, it would be interesting to determine whether the finding of Ghani & Garnett
(2000) — that infectivity is more contingent on global network structures — is corroborated. This would oer a
more complete picture of the overall risk environment.
6.18 In addition, future versions of the RUSH-PNBMmodel itself will be increasingly honed. For example, our team
will conduct survey research to evaluate the economic and human dimensions underlying choices to adopt
methodsand technologiesaimedatbolsteringproducer-level biosecurity. Another future researchgoal is touse
experimental gamingdata todetermine the circumstancesunderwhich individuals choose toadoptbiosecurity
protocols in risky and/or uncertain decision environments (Merrill et al. 2018). We can then program the agents
in RUSH-PNBM to adapt their behavior under parallel conditions in the model. Coupling such insights with
network-based risk analyses — especially those calibrated around real-world production chain systems — will
allow for a deeper understanding of the human-behavioral solutions that may promote the adoption of risk-
mitigating protocols, as well as helping to focus biosecurity protocol adoption upon the nodes at which it will
have the greatest eect on system-wide disease resilience.
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